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SUPREME COURT REVIEW (1973)
are; what "serious literary, artistic, political and
scientific value" means; how much latitude a jury
has in applying these standards; and finally, how
much latitude the state legislature may take in
defining and proscribing "specific depictions or
descriptions of sexual conduct." Whatever the
results of this new approach, another round will
surely follow.
ENTRAPMENT
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973)
The Supreme Court in United States v. Russell'
decided whether a government agent's supply of a
means for the commission of an offense to a de-
fendant intending to commit the offense was a
violation of due process or an entrapment. A
majority of five held that furnishing a difficult to
obtain but legal chemical needed in the illegal
manufacture of a drug and a subsequent prosecu-
tion for the manufacture and sale of the drug did
not violate due process. The Court also refused to
alter the bisis of the entrapment defense estab-
lished in Sorrells v. United States2 and affirmed in
Sherman v. United States.' Under the theory offered
in those cases, the defense is successful only if the
prosecution fails to prove that the defendant had
a predisposition or general intention to commit the
crime encouraged by the government. Entrapment
did not, as concurring opinions to Sorrells and
Sherman urged and as Russell argued, bar a prose-
cution because the law enforcement conduct itself
is found objectionable to a court. So defined, the
defense was properly unavailable to Russell.
Richard Russell and two others, John and
Patrick Connolly, were indicted and Russell was
convicted of illegally manufacturing and selling
methamphetamine, commonly known as "speed."
Joseph Shapiro, an agent of the Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs, met with the three
in December, 1969. He told them he represented
a group desiring to obtain control of the manu-
facture and distribution of methamphetamine in
the Pacific northwest. He offered to supply them
with phenyl-2-propanone (P-2-P), a chemical
required to manufacture methamphetamine. In
return, he wanted to receive one half of the speed
1411 U.S. 423 (1973). Justice Rehnquist wrote the
majority opinion for himself, Chief Justice Burger andjustices White, Blackmun and Powell. Justice Douglas
wrote a dissent concurred in by Justice Marshall andjustice Stewart dissented in another opinion with
Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring.
1287 U.S. 435 (1932).
3 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
made with his P-2-P. The chemical at that time
could be sold legally but was difficult to obtain
because the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drug- had asked drug manufacturers to stop selling
it. Russell and the Connollys made methampheta-
mine a few days later with Shapiro's P-2-P and
Shapiro received his share the next day. 4 He also
bought some of the remainder from Russell.
At his trial, Russell moved for acquittal because
of entrapment as a matter of law. The motion was
denied. The trial court gave the jury a standard
entrapment instruction5 and Russell was found
guilty.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, a divided court
reversed the conviction and ordered the indict-
ment dismissed.6 There, it was conceded by
Russell that the jury's finding of predisposition
which precluded a verdict of not guilty, could be
supported by the evidence. However, the majority
held that a defense to a criminal charge could be
founded upon "an intolerable degree of govern-
mental participation in the enterprise." 7 The
4 Shapiro's offer to supply P-2-P was conditioned
upon receiving a tour of the laboratory in Patrick
Connolly's home where the methamphetamine would be
produced and inspection of previously manufactured
speed.5 The jury was to acquit if it had:
a reasonable doubt whether the defendant had the
previous intent to commit the offense ... and did
so only because he was induced or persuaded by
some officer or agent of the government.
411 U.S. at 427 n.4. A source of confusion among
lower federal courts is the burden placed on the
defendant to show government inducement in order to
shift the burden to the government to show previous
intent or predisposition. The courts are also con-
cerned about confusion in the minds of jurors arising
from the application of these different burdens. For
the varying results see, e.g., Kadis v. United States,
373 F.2d 370, 373-74 (1st Cir. 1967); United States v.
Riley, 363 F.2d 955, 958-59 (2d Cir. 1966); Notaro v.
United States, 363 F.2d 169, 175 (9th Cir. 1966
Sagansky v. United States, 358 F. 2d 195, 203 (1st
Cir. 1966).
6 United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir.
cert. granted, 409 U.S. 911 (1972).
7 Id. at 673.
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majority offered two theories for this holding, but
did not choose to specify which was responsible for
the result since both mandated the same conclu-
sion in this case. The court first noted two federal
court decisions holding that regardless of a pre-
disposition, entrapment occurred as a matter of
law when the government supplied the contra-
band.8 Although P-2-P was legal to possess, the
court assumed that Russell could not have com-
mitted the offense without the "pervasive inter-
vention" of the government. 9 Secondly, the court
noted that besides entrapment, a bar to prosecu-
tion may be predicated upon extreme government
involvement in the criminal enterprise.10 Both
theories, the court said, were based upon due
process and reflected a judicial reluctance to
approve extreme law enforcement tactics.
The government sought a writ of certiorari from
the Supreme Court to review the Ninth Circuit's
8 United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir.
1971); United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307
(C.D. Cal. 1970). In Bueno I, the Fifth Circuit reversed
the conviction of the defendant and remanded the case
because the government produced no evidence to rebut
defendant's assertion that the government's informer
gave him heroin which defendant in turn sold to an
undercover agent. The court held that as a matter of
law, a defendant cannot be convicted if the illegal
substance was supplied by the government. On retrial,
the government produced the informer who contra-
dicted the defendant's testimony. On appeal, the court
of appeals affirmed the conviction. United States v.
Bueno, 470 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1972). In Chisum, the
indictment against the defendant was dismissed be-
cause the government delivered counterfeit money to
the accused who had solicited it from another. The
court found entrapment an affront to the concepts ofjustice and ruled that the supply of contraband, no
matter what the defendant's predisposition to commit
the crime, was entrapment as a matter of law. The
court reasoned that if it allowed prosecution, it "would
be to countenance violations of justice." 312 F. Supp.
at 1312. The court also felt that entrapment was a
violation of due process. Chisnu, in large part, relied
on the decisions in United States v. Silva, 180 F. Supp.
557 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) and United States v. Dillet, 265 F.
Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Both those cases involved
successful use of the entrapment defense because a
government informer could have been the source of
the drugs the defendants supplied to undercover agents.
In this respect, they are factually similar to Bueno I.
For a recent decision analyzing the decision in Chisum
to determine what constitutes government supply of
an illegal substance, see United States v. Mahoney, 355
F. Supp. 418 (E.D. La. 1973).
9 459 F.2d at 673.
'Id. at 674. As the basis for this theory, the court
relied upon Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th
Cir. 1971). There, the court reversed convictions of the
defendants accused of illegal manufacture of liquor.
An undercover agent helped the defendants re-establish
themselves as bootleggers after their release from
prison. The agent remained their sole customer for
over a year, until their arrest.
conclusions of law. The government admitted that
due process may be violated if a government agent
was the sole source of means to commit a crime,
but claimed that was not the case here. The
government argued that while Sorrells and Sherman
dealt only with solicitation to commit a crime,
both decisions tolerated the supply of a means to
commit an offense to a defendant found predis-
posed." And, even assuming that the degree of
law enforcement conduct alone determines en-
trapment, it was argued that the agent's activity
in this case did not reach that level.
Sorrells and Sherman are the only two Supreme
Court decisions before Russell dealing with the
theory of entrapment in the federal courts. In
Sorrells, the Court analyzed the various bases put
forward by lower federal courts and state courts
to determine whether entrapment constituted a
bar to prosecution or a defense to a criminal
charge." The majority chose to view it as a de-
fense because of the constitutional difficulty they
found in an approach which would bar a prosecu-
tion. To do that, they felt, would in effect grant
immunity, which was not a function of the ju-
diciary.
The Court in Sorrells held that a defendant is en-
trapped when the origin of intent to commit a
criminal offense was in the government agent who
encouraged or persuaded the defendent to commit
an offense which the defendant did not intend to
commit prior to the agent's activity. If the de-
fendant, after "an appropriate and searching in-
quiry into his own conduct and predisposition" "
was found to be entrapped by the fact finder, he
was innocent of the crime charged. The majority
reasoned that the act of an entrapped defendant
was not within the scope of the statute. They
believed that Congress could not have intended
its statutes to "be abused by the instigation by
government officials of an act on the part of per-
"t Where a criminal predisposition can be proved,
"the fact that officers or employees of the Government
merely afford opportunities or facilities for the com-
mission of the offense does not defeat the prosecution."
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932),
quoted in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372(1958).
1For discussions of the evolution of the entrap-
ment doctrine in the federal courts see DeFeo, Entrap-
ment As A Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its
History, Theory and Application, 1 U.S.F.L. REv. 243
(1967); Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment In The
Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. Rav. 245 (1942); Orfield,
The Defense of Entrapment in The Federal Courts.
1967 DuKE L.J. 39 (1967).
Is 287 U.S. at 451.
[Vol. 64
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sons otherwise innocent in order.., to punish
them." 14
Justice Roberts, concurring in Sorrells, believed
the true basis of entrapment was analogous to the
equitable and civil law doctrine that courts should
not "tolerate the use of their process to consum-
mate a wrong." 15 Conviction of an entrapped
defendant should be barred to protect the court's
function of administering justice. Unfortunately,
he offered no test to determine when law enforce-
ment conduct barred a prosecution. While Justice
Roberts said that entrapment occurs "where a
law officer envisages a crime, plans it and activates
its commission by one not theretofore intending
its perpetration;"' he felt evidence of the accused's
predisposition was a "false issue." 17 Once a de-
fendant proved entrapment through inducement
or instigationi8 to commit the offense, Roberts
argued that it was the duty of the court to release
the defendant immediately.1 9 Justice Roberts'
analysis thus required a determination of causa-
tion although he felt only police conduct should be
examined.
A test for determining when law enforcement
conduct becomes entrapment was provided by
Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in
Sherman v. Unikd States.20 There, Chief Justice
Warren's majority opinion reaffirmed the origin of
intent test of Sorrells. He found no reason to
reassess the theory of entrapment since that issue
was not raised before the Supreme Court or in the
lower courts.
Justice Frankfurter's analysis of entrapment was
basically the same as Justice Roberts'. Both felt
14 Id. at 448.
11Id. at 455 (Roberts, J., concurring). justice
Roberts felt there were serious constitutional problems
in the majority's theory of entrapment. He saw their
approach as a judicial amendment of legislation. He
analogized the defense made available by the majority
to the judicial modification of a statutorily prescribed
penalty, which was found to be a non-judicial function
in Ez parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916). 287 U.S.
at 458.
126 287 U.S. at 454 (Roberts, J., concurring).
'7 Id. at 458.
Is Throughout the opinions in Sorrells, Sherman and
Russell, the words inducement and instigation are
used. Their definition can only be ascertained by regard
to their use in context. To the majorities in those cases,
a defendant is induced only if he had no predisposition
to commit the offense prior to the government's activ-
ity. The justices who believed that government conduct
alone is to be examined usually mean unacceptable
encouragement to commit the offense, or encourage-
ment beyond the level of resistance of a law abiding
citizen.19 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring).
20 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
the only true Congressional intent to be derived
from a reading of a statute "is... to make criminal
precisely the conduct in which the defendant has
engaged." 2' And, like Justice Roberts, Justice
Frankfurter believed that the reason why an
entrapped defendant is freed is the judiciary's
supervision of the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts, not the fact that the
conduct was not criminal in a statutory sense."
The decision in McNabb v. United States" which
came after Sarrelh, demonstrated that this su-
pervisory function was necessary to preserve public
confidence in the fair and honorable administra-
tion of criminal justice and transcends the interest
of society in the conviction of a defendant. 24
Like Justice Roberts, Justice Frankfurter be-
lieved a determination of an accused's predisposi-
tion was irrelevant to the question of entrapment
and highly prejudicial to the defendant. His test to
determine whether the government's conduct
amounted to an entrapment was objective. It
focused on the impact of the government's conduct
on an average individual, not the intent of the
particular defendant. Activity that encouraged the
commission of a crime by a person other than one
ready and willing to commit it was beyond the
proper scope of governmental power and therefore
constituted entrapment. 2 1 Justice Frankfurther
felt that this test would provide guidance for
acceptable police conduct that was otherwise
lacking if its validity was determined by a retro-
spective determination of a particular defendant's
predisposition.
justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in
Rssell, declined to overrule Sorrells because of
its long standing precedent and its affirmance in
Sherman. Therefore, he felt no need to answer a
history of criticism of the theory of implied legisla-
tive intent said to underlie the defense, or to meet
the argument that the origin of intent test creates
an unacceptable difference in law enforcement
activity permissible against predisposed and non-
2Id. at 379 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
22Id. at 380.
"318 U.S. 332 (1943).
24Insofar as they are used as instrumentalities
in the administration of criminal justice, the federal
courts have an obligation to set their face against
enforcement of the law by lawless means or means
that violate rationally vindicated standards ofjustice, and to refuse to sustain such methods by
effectuating them.
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
25 Id. at 383-84.
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predisposed defendants. 26 The majority also agreed
with criticism of Justice Roberts' position tendered
by two courts in different stages of the Sherman
case. This criticism was that Justice Roberts'
opinion would not allow the government to show
that a person was ready and willing to commit the
crime after the defendant proved government in-
ducement.27 However well placed this criticism
is, it would seem to be only of academic interest to
the majority in Russell after Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Sherman.
The Russell majority did not ignore the alter-
native formulation of entrapment offered by the
concurring opinions in both Sorrells and Sherman.
But they found it undesirable to bar a prosecu-
tion against one who intended to commit a criminal
act and did commit it only because the proffered
encouragement exceeded the resistance of a person
not disposed to commit the act.
The Court criticized lower federal court opinions
which reversed convictions because of a dislike for
what amounted to overzealous law enforcement.2
16 For criticism of the entrapment defense estab-
lished in Sorrells, see 1 WORKING PAPERS Or THE
NATIONAL COMMIsSION ON RFol m or FEDERAL
CR MuNAL LAws, 317-20 (1970); Donnelly, Judicial
Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent
Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1090, 1101-15 (1951);
Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of En-
couragement, 49 U. VA. L. REv. 871, 895-99 (1963);
Williams, The Defense of Entrapment and Related
Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28 FoRDHA L.
REv. 399, 417 (1959); Comment, Administration of
the Affirmative Trap and the Doctrine of Entrapment:
Device and Defense, 31 U. Ci. L. REv. 137, 169-73
(1963); Comment, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I
Did Eat: The Constitutional Status of The Entrapment
Defense, 74 YALE L. J. 942 (1965).
17 Chief Justice Warren, in his majority opinion in
Sherman, observed that the burden on the prosecution
would be obvious if it could not reply to a charge of
inducement amounting to entrapment by showing the
defendant's conduct was due to his own readiness to
commit the offense. 356 U.S. at 376. Warren then noted
a portion of Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Sher-
man's first appeal to the Second Circuit:
Indeed, it would seem probable that, if there were
no reply [to the claim of inducement) it would be
impossible ever to secure convictions of any
offences which consist of transactions that are
carried out in secret.
United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir.
1952), .quoted in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
369, 377 n. 7 (1958). See also text accompanying nn.
16-19 supra.
2 The Court probably was referring to decisions
such as United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th
Cir. 1972), judgm't vacated and remanded, 93 S. Ct.
2769 (1973); Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783(9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Chisum, 312 F.
Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal 1970). In each of those cases, the
court reversed because of the type or level of a gov-
ernment agent's activity.
These courts went beyond the opinions in Sorrells
and Sherman and presented unnecessary and awk-
ward standards for execution of laws by the
Executive branch.2 9 According to Justice Rehn-
quist the majority opinions in Sorrells and Sher-
man demonstrated that the entrapment defense
was a narrow one and was not intended to give
the judiciary a "chancellor's foot" veto over dis-
tasteful law enforcement practices. Furthermore,
because the defense was not of constitutional di-
mensions, Congress was free to formulate any
definition of the defense it found desirable.30
2 411 U.S. at 435. The general criticism of the stan-
dards used by some of the lower federal courts is not
without merit. Many of the decisions which found
entrapment as a matter of law solely because of the
government's conduct are conspicuous in their failure
to discuss the application of any sort of test to the
conduct. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in
Sherman is often invoked, but the test he offered is
ignored or misstated. In the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Russell, for example, the court said that the test for
entrapment devised by Frankfurter was whether the
police conduct "falls below standards, to which common
feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental
power." 459 F.2d at 673, quoting 356 U.S. at 382
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). The test Frankfurter
did devise served as a barometer to determine when the
conduct did fall below those standards.
20 411 U.S. at 435. Codification of entrapment as a
defense or bar to prosecution is proposed in bills pend-
ing before the current Congress to revise Title 18 U.S.C.,
the federal criminal code. The National Commission
on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws defined entrap-
ment as an affirmative defense occurring where a law
enforcement officer used "persuasion or other means
likely to cause normally law abiding persons to.commit
the offense." Mere offer of an opportunity to commit an
offense would not constitute entrapment. FInAL
REPoRT or T=E NATiONAL COmassION ON REzoRM
OX FEDERAL CRIMNAl. LAws-A PROPosED NEw
FEDERAL CaRnuAL CODE § 702," at 58 (1971). As it
was initially introduced in the Senate, the proposed
criminal code defined entrapment as a bar to prosecu-
tion available where the law enforcement officer or
agent used methods "of inducement or encouragement
as create a substantial risk that the conduct would be
committed by persons other than those who are ready
to commit it." Affording an opportunity to commit an
offense was not entrapment, and the risk would be less
substantial where the officer knew that the individual
previously engaged in similarly prohibited conduct. The
bar would not be available when the encouraged crime
is causing or threatening serious bodily injury or harm.
S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st. Sess. § 1-3B2. (1973). A proposal
supported by the current administration appears to
follow the origin of intent theory of Sorrells because
entrapment is defined as a defense where the defendant
was not predisposed to commit the offense charged.
But it also states that solicitation "which would not
induce an ordinary law-abiding citizen to commit an
offense" does not constitute entrapment. H.R. 6046,
93d Cong. 1st. Sess. § 531 (1973). Since the majority in
Russell believed that any definition of entrapment
established by Congress is permissible, it would be
interesting to consider whether Congress could .enact
criminal legislation specifically including within its
[Vol. 64
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The majority chose not to respond directly to
Russell's contention that he was entrapped as a
matter of law regardless of his predisposition, and
instead restated the theory of entrapment 'de-
veloped in Sorrells. Russell attempted to distin-
guish both Sorrells and Sherman from the facts of
his own case on the ground that those cases only
involved solicitation to do an act, while Shapiro
provided the necessary means for the commission
of the defense. This, it was argued, was the manu-
facturing of crime prohibited by the entrapment
defense.3'
Lower federal courts and state courts held in
other cases that knowing or unknowing govern-
ment supply of an illegal substance through a law
enforcement agent or an informer was entrap-
ment." Only one of the cases so holding attempted
to reconcile the result with the origin of intent test
mandated by Sorrells. 3 Rather, the primary reason
seemed to be that the government could not be
the source of the sine quo nan of an offense.4 But
the Court in Russell implicitly rejected that rea-
soning by observing that entrapment is a defense
limited by an assumed intent of Congress not to
punish those persons the government caused to
commit an offense who had no prior intent to do
so. Shapiro's activity provided only permissible
"opportunities or facilities for the commission of
an offense," 11 and was not the source of an intent
scope the act of an entrapped defendant. There is some
authority for the proposition that a denial by a state
of a defense or bar to prosecution because of entrap-
ment would be unconstitutional. United States ex rel.
Hall v. Illinois, 329 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1964).
31In Sorrels, the majority said the government
cannot punish for an offense which is the creative
activity of its own officers. 287 U.S. at 451. Numerous
courts have found entrapment because they deemed
the activity of the government to be creative. But they
do not use the term in the sense it was offered in Sorrells:
The government's activity becomes creative only when
the defendant had no pre-existing intention to commit
the offense solicited or encouraged or a similar offense.
To see how some other courts applied the concept see,
e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 449 (1973)
(Stewart, J., dissenting); McGrath v. United States
468 F.2d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Silva, 180 F. Supp. 557, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
( See, e g. McGrath v. United States, 468 F.2d 1027
(7th Cir. i972); United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903
(5th Cir. 1971); Chisum v. United States, 312 F. Supp.
1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970); People v. Strong, 21 Ill. 2d
320, 172 N.E.2d 765 (1961).
"United States v. Dillett, 265 F. Supp. 980, 985
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
.4 People v. Strong, 21 Ill. 2d 320, 325, 172 N.E.
2d 765, 768 (1961).
"' Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932),
quoted in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,
372 (1958) and United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
435 (1973).
to commit a crime that would not otherwise occur.
Therefore, the court of appeals erred when it
broadened the entrapment defense by considering
the propriety of government conduct beyond deter-
mining whether it was the source of intent. In
addition, it may be inferred that since the Court
saw entrapment arising only when the original
intent for an accused to commit an act is in the
government, lower courts holding that entrapment
occurred because the government's agent supplied
the illegal substance also are erroneous.
Russell also argued that the proper way to view
the government's activity was as a violation of due
process and not as entrapment. Both the. govern-
ment and Russell suggested in their briefs before
the Court that a conviction may be precluded on
due process grounds when the government was the
sole source of an otherwise unobtainable and
necessary means to the commission of an offense.36
The majority's opinion did concede that some
conduct of law enforcement officials may be so
"outrageous that due process principles would
absolutely bar the government from invoking
judicial processes to obtain a conviction."' 7
Nevertheless, the majority believed that the con-
duct of the government in this case fell short of vio-
lating those principles.
The Court said, instead, that Russell could not
take advantage of the rule he pfopounded. It
observed that P-2-P was difficult, but not impossi-
ble to obtain. The evidence showed that two
bottles of the chemical were found after Shapiro
supplied a bottle a month earlier. Furthermore, the
defendants were said to have admitted manufac-
turing or selling methamphetamine before and
after Shapiro's offer. s Therefore, the Court could
conclude that P-2-P not only could be obtained,
but was, in fact, available to the defendants.39
Shapiro's activity was categorized as "scarcely
objectionable" primarily because the P-2-P was
legal to possess and harmless. Furthermore, the
Court felt that successful government infiltration
36411 U.S. at 431, n. 8.
37 Id. at 431-32.
"The dissenting judge in Russell's appeal to the
Ninth Circuit recited portions of the trial transcript
indicating that John Connolly previously manufactured
speed and that Patrick Connolly refused a later offer
by Shapiro of more P-2-P because he already had some.
Russell v. United States, 459 F 2d 671 675 (1972)
(Trask, J., dissenting). Russell and one of the Connollys
also attempted to purchase P-2-P after. Shapiro's
initial 'offer, but were unable to do so. Brief for Re-
spondent at 4.
"411 U.S. at 431.
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of, and limited participation in, unlawful enter-
prises is a valid method of gathering evidence of
criminal activity that would otherwise be unob-
tainable after the commission of an offense.
Evidence of similar past activity would be almost
impossible to obtain because of the paucity of
complaining victims participating in sumptuary
criminal acts.40 Since infiltration is necessary as
a detection device, the majority felt it only rea-
sonable to allow an undercover agent to supply an
item the enterprise needs. If that were not per-
mitted, it would follow that the infiltrator would
have a difficult time proving good faith and gaining
the confidence of the participants.4 Viewed as
legitimate and lawful activity, Shapiro's conduct
then violated none of Russell's independent con-
stitutional rights.
Four Justices dissented from this viewpoint in
two opinions.4 Justice Douglas was not impressed
with the fact that P-2-P could be obtained from
other sources. In his view, supply of the chemical
"made the United States an active participant in
the unlawful activity." 4 Douglas expressed
approval of Justice Frankfurter's views in Sherman,
but made no attempt to examine whether the
government conduct in Russell exceeded the level
permitted by the Frankfurter objective test. He
concluded by saying that law enforcement officials
played a debased role by furnishing a chemical
necessary for the manufacture of an illegal drug."
Justice Douglas' dissent also omitted any discus-
sion of the due process arguments raised by
Russell. Essentially, his dissent applied a set of
values different from the majority's in examining
Shapiro's conduct. What Justice Douglas found
to be an illegitimate governmental enterprise, the
majority treated as a necessary corollary to the
infiltration and subsequent prosecution of clan-
destine criminal activity.
Justice Stewart authored the other dissent. He
also agreed with justices Roberts and Frankfurter
that the entrapment defense 5 is grounded in the
40 See DeFeo, Entrapment As A Defense to Criminal
Responsibiy: Its History, Tlory and Application, 1
U.S.F.L. REV. 243, 250 (1967); Watt, The Defense of
Entrapment, 13 Cms. L. Q. 313, 314 (1971).
41411 U.S. at 432.
42 See note I supra.
43411 U.S. at 437 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 439.
46 Justice Stewart's dissent described both the origin
of intent test and police conduct theories of entrap-
ment as defenses. Since only the origin of intent test
can result in a verdict of not guilty, it alone is a defense.
The police conduct theory bars a prosecution if it is
successful.
belief that extreme law enforcement activities
simply cannot be countenanced by courts. The
controlling question had to be whether the govern-
ment's activity was likely to create a crime. These
dissenters could not believe that the defense gave
effect to an unexpressed Congressional intent to
exclude from its criminal statutes and liability
persons who committed a proscribed act.46 He
found the origin of intent test greatly flawed be-
cause it failed to explain why a person not origi-
nally intending an offense and induced by a
private individual would not be entitled to use
entrapment as a defense. If entrapment only oc-
curs when the government was the original source
of intent to commit the act, Justice Stewart
thought it only followed that the government's-
conduct alone must be the primary focus of in-
quiry.A7
Stewart's dissent observed that under any
definition, entrapment would occur when the
government was the sole source of a means to
commit an offense. He apparently favored a test
that would find an entrapment when, absent the
government's activity, no crime would occur.4"
In contrast, the majority chose to view entrap-
ment as occurring only when, absent the govern-
ment's activity, no crime would occur because the
accused had no prior intention to commit the act.
The Stewart dissent went further than condemning
the government's supply of an unobtainable means.
He assumed at one point that the P-2-P could
otherwise be obtained, but observed that the
prosecution in this case was possible only because
agent Shapiro supplied the chemical. That cast
doubt on the theory that P-2-P was available
elsewhere and that the government only furnished
an opportunity to commit the act. If the chem-
ical was available, the agent should only have
offered to buy the finished product. The govern-
ment still could have obtained the same convic-
tions. 49 Shapiro's activities, then, satisfied these
dissenters that entrapment occurred as a matter
of law.
Justice Stewart's dissent is flawed in the same
manner as Justice Douglas'. Both dissents railed
against the undue promotion of crime by the
government which the Frankfurter test was de-
signed to measure, but that test was not applied
4"411 U.S. at 441-42 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
47Id. at 442.
48 Id. at 449.
41 Id. at 448-49.
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and only value judgments about the government's
conduct remain.
All of the opinions in Russell acknowledge that
some government promotion of crime must be
tolerated. The very fact of solicitation promotes
crime, but it is a means of detecting a present
offense at the convenience of law enforcement
officials. Application of Justice Frankfurter's test
would require asking, and answering, whether the
conduct of the government agent was so excessive
as to cause a reasonable, law abiding citizen to
manufacture and sell methamphetamine to a
stranger. Both dissents show the undesirability of
attempting to use either the origin of intent or ob-
jective theory of entrapment as a defense to a
crime committed by a predisposed defendant made
possible by means supplied by the government.
The majority looked only to the origin of intent
to commit the act. Russell's apparent ready
acceptance of Shapiro's offer barred the successful
use of Justice Frankfurter's test. The temptation
that was offered can hardly be considered strong
enough to overcome the resistance of a person not
then ready and willing to commit the offense.
Successful invocation of the entrapment defense
under the facts of this case would indicate that the
defense bore no relation either to the accused's
general intention to commit the offense or the
effect of the government's conduct on a law abid-
ing citizen.50 A better argument against the
legitimization of such law enforcement conduct
would be the due process argument raised by
Russell before the Supreme Court.m While the
10 Some courts have suggested that predisposition
should be examined along with the government's
activity; If the latter exceeds what the court determines
to be the proper use of government power, an entrap-
ment occurred. See United States v. Morrison, 348
F.2d 1003 1004-05 (2d. Cir. 1965), Accardi v. United
States, 25 F.2d 168, 172-73 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1958).61 Commentary on the entrapment defense suggests
that it is actually rooted in due process considerations
or a part of the fourth or fifth amendment. See Roten-
berg, The Police Defection Practice of Encouragement,
49 U. VA. L. REv. 871, 882-83 (1963); Comment, The
Court thought that Russell could not take ad-
vantage of a rule that would find the supply of
an otherwise unobtainable means by the govern-
ment violative of due process, it did imply that
some related law enforcement conduct could
violate due process. The Court added qualifica-
tions to its endorsement of Shapiro's activity.
P-2-P was legal and harmless and was not the
offensive substance; evidence existed that the
chemical was otherwise available; Shapiro's par-
ticipation in the offense was limited to the supply
of P-2-P; and there was evidence that the de-
fendants made speed before and after Shapiro's
offer of P-2-P.
The supply of a legal ingredient needed for the
manufacture of an illegal drug did not seem funda-
mentally unfair to the majority because of the
relation of that activity to the successful detection
of sumptuary criminal acts. It was not entrapment
because the accused was predisposed to commit the
offense, or a similar one, before the agent made his
offer. The dissenters found the activity an en-
trapment, although they did so out of a dislike
for the activity and not because it violated a test
they purport to embrace. Their dislike would be
better framed in the context of a violation of due
process where notions of fairness can properly be
considered. The fundamental disagreement be-
tween the majority and the dissenters may have
less to do with the legal niceties of defining en-
trapment than with the difference in opinion over
what methods law enforcement officials can
properly use to detect victimless crimes.
Entrapment Doctrine in Federal Courts and Some State
Court Comparisons, 49 J. Cmm. L.C. & P.S. 447, 449
(1959); Comment, 1964 U. Irx. L. Fon. 821 (1964);
Comment, The Serpent Beguiled Me And I Did Eat:
The Constitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense,
74 Ymrm L.J. 942 (1965). Those articles suggest that
values of privacy, dignity and personal integrity under-
lying the fourth amendment limit government in its
search for possible solicitees to criminal offenses. A
good summary of those views, and a critique, is found
in Orfield, The Defense of Entrapment in the Federal
Courts, 1967 fuxE L.J. 39, 53-56 n. 100-04 (1967).
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